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The Problem of Judicial Discretion
Anthony T. ~onman
Martin Golding has performed a useful service for us by describing in
summary form many of the main themes that have been at the center of
American legal theory over the course of the last century. From the range of
topics that he describes, I would like to pick out one for special emphasis and
to say a word or two about it. I pick this particular topic because its persist-
ence in American legal philosophy as a subject of controversy and debate has
itself been, in some ways, a distinctive feature of our jurisprudential tradi-
tion. The American obsession with the problem that I am about to describe
is, I think, peculiar to our legal culture and an interesting question, though
not one I shall' try to answer, is why that should be so. Why should we have
been so preoccupied-at times, it seems, almost obsessively-with this
particular problem rather than with any of a number of other issues that
might as reasonably have claimed our attention?
The problem that I have in mind is the problem of judicial discretion, a
problem that is posed by Holmes's characterization of adjudication as a form
of legislation. In "The Path of the Law," Holmes asserts that a judge
deciding cases must, of necessity, act as a legislator since the applicable legal
rules cannot conceivably constrain him in the way the Langdellian concep-
tion of law as a system of deductive propositions suggests it does. There is
always some discretionary space (Holmes didn't say always, but his realist
followers in the 1930s did) in which the judge enjoys freedom of movement,
freedom to decide that the case before him calls for the application of one
principle or policy-one legislative program-rather than another, a discre-
tionary space in which the judge's decisional processes are not and cannot be
mechanically predetermined by the applicable rules of law.
The idea that there is an irreducible element of free creativity, of interpret-
ative freedom, in the adjudicative process which is left over, so to speak, after
one has taken account of all the rules that might conceivably bear on the case
at hand is today an idea so familiar, so patently obvious, that it has lost all of
its original power to shock or disturb. Despite its prosaic obviousness,
however, Holmes's characterization of adjudication as a species of legisla-
tion gave rise to a problem that is still very much at the center of our
concerns-the problem of how to account for the legitimacy of adjudication
when it is conceived in this new Holmesian light.
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If judges are legislators and not adjudicators who are merely applying the
rules they have been authorized to apply in the cases that come before them,
what is it that gives their decisions legitimacy or authority? This is a difficult
question, and however obvious the Holmesian view may seem as a starting
point of analysis, it is a question to which we do not yet have a single
confident answer. It would be impossible, in the short time that I have, to
describe even in a sketchy way the extraordinary range of responses that have
been offered to the problem of judicial discretion. I would, however, like to
say a few words about two of these reponses; although they do not represent
the only alternatives, each has at least proven sufficiently attractive to win
the adherence of a large number of supporters and to hold their allegiance
over the course of an entire century.
The first response might be put in the following way: The problem with
the Langdellian conception of law is its overly narrow characterization of
what the law is, of what must be included within our conception of the legal
system itself. If one thinks that the law is made up of nothing but relatively
hard-edged and unambiguous rules, then the problem of judicial discretion
is bound to seem both unavoidable and unresolvable. But it is naive to think
that that is all the law contains. The law includes more than just those
crisply decisive normative standards that we have in mind when we refer to
legal rules; it also includes, for example, what Ronald, Dworkin has called
policies and principles, criteria of decision that have a generality and
breadth which distinguishes them from legal rules as they are traditionally
conceived. By adding these policies and principles to our conception of what
a legal order typically includes we advance a long way toward a view in
which the problem of discretion no longer seems so difficult or terrifying.
Principles and policies provide guidance in the interpretation of hard-edged
rules in situations where different and conflicting interpretations of the rules
themselves are possible, and they also fill in much of the discretionary space
which is left over even after all the rules have been taken into account. So a
judge who is bound to apply the law, where the law means not just rules but
principles and policies too, has considerably less discretion than he might be
said to have if the law that he were responsible for administering consisted of
rules and rules alone.
If you think about it for a moment, however, it is obvious that the problem
of discretion is bound to reappear with regard to the very principles and
policies that have been introducted in order to dissolve the difficulty which
the Langdellian conception of law creates. Rules, principles, and policies all
work successfully in part because of their generality and opentexturedness; it
is just this characteristic, however, which brings them into conflict with one
another and makes them ultimately indecisive when applied to the questions
presented by particular cases. To put it even more simply, if there is discre-
tion to apply a particular legal rule one way rather than another, than there
will also be discretion in the application of principles and policies.
By invoking them in aid it might seem, therefore, that we have done
nothing more than jump out of the frying pan and into the fire. In response
it has been suggested that instead of trying to solve the problem of discretion
by addi.ng to the inventory of items which the legal order includes we ought
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to reconceive the process of adjudication itself. When a judge decides a case
he does so not as a single individual standing in olympian isolation, but as a
member of a professional community which is itself the bearer of a specific
intellectual and moral tradition. Deeply embedded in that tradition, the
judge views himself as being able to say only certain things and forbidden to
say others. The tradition of thought within which the judge is situated, and
within whose horizon he encounters his task, constrains-him in the discre-
tionary decisions that he makes. The way to put the boogey-man of discre-
tion to rest, it has been suggested, is merely to take note of the obvious fact
that when judges decide cases, they do so subject to the constraints arising
from a set of common understandings which they share with the other
members of the interpretive community to which they belong. This is the
view that I\arl Llewellyn developed very forcefully in his later writings, and
which has recently been taken up and reinvigorated by Stanley Fish and by
my colleague Owen Fiss.
A second approach to the problem of discretion, different from the one I
have been describing, starts from another famous utterance of Holmes, also
contained in "The Path of the Law." In that essay Holmes remarks that
although for the moment the law belongs to the black letter man, the law of
the future will be made, as he puts it, by the man of statistics and economics.
Holmes's meaning, I believe, is this: whatever we choose to include in our
conception of law, the legal order as a whole will continue to be so
permeated by ambiguity and indecisiveness that the prospects of ever finding
firm ground within it are remote. To discover (or rather to invent) a firm
basis for legal decision we must leave the domain of law for the larger realm
of politics. If one believes, however, (as Holmes himself may have) that it is
possible to identify fundamental political principles capable of guiding the
application of legal norms, and believes, in addition, that a procedure can be
devised for applying these principles in a rigorous and disciplined way to the
decision of specific cases, then the problem of judicial discretion is bound to
lose much of its apparent sting. A judge who has given up on the law as
hopelessly indeterminate can still find relief in a theory of politics that
promises die objectivity and rigor which the law itself has proven unable to
supply. I suppose one might say that this second approach to the problem of
discretion-which Holmes hints at and which is developed systematically by
later writers like Lasswell and McDougal and championed, most recently, by
Bruce Ackerman-rests on the optimistic belief that a science of politics can
ultimately be found to replace the science of law which Langdell had origi-
nally hoped to construct but which Holmes and his realist successors
demonstrated to be impossible on the terms Langdell himself proposed. This
way of dealing with the problem of discretion does not rely on the concepts
of tradition and interpretive community, but on the vastly different notions
of science and scientific method.
I suppose one might reject both of the alternatives I have considered by
maintaining that the idea of a science of politics is as much a will-of-the-
wisp as the idea of a science of law, and by attacking the notion of a
community of interpretive understanding as either intellectually empty or
ideologically suspect. But what are we left with if we abandon these two
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strategies? If we take the further step of abandoning all ne effort to
find a satisfactory solution to the problem of judicial discretIOn, and simply
resign ourselves, as some today suggest we should, to the groundlessness of
decision, we are left, I think, with a conception of adjudication that is
intellectually incoherent and morally bankrupt. And that would be a matter
of more than merely academic concern, for it would strike at the heart of our
conception of professional integrity and undermine the pride we take in the
practice of our craft.
